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When I was one of Richard Flathman’s graduate students in the early 2000s, I found reading his 
books frustrating. They were like especially erudite issues of the New Yorker, full of thoughtful 
reflections that never quite settled any of the issues they so ably illuminated and pondered. At the 
same time, I was intrigued by his persona (I don’t think I knew him well enough to have gotten 
to know his personality). At a time when indoor smoking was banned at Johns Hopkins, he had 
somehow finagled an exception, and his office was a stygian cave of books, papers, cardigans, 
and smoke. He was a curmudgeonly presence in the department, always ready with a sarcastic 
aside or a bemused snort at pomposity (though with students he was unfailingly encouraging and 
generous). 
As I read more of his work, I thought I saw the same man there, someone who at core wanted to 
be left the hell alone to read and think—that is, to pursue his own “felicity” (a frequently used 
word borrowed from Hobbes) in his own way. And there clearly is this side to Flathman’s work, 
for example in his powerful defense of individuality against the claims of community, and his 
fondness for Michael Oakeshott’s societas (an association of people who recognize that 
cooperation will best allow them to pursue their different, individual aims) rather than 
universitas (an association of people who cooperate to pursue an aim they hold in common). At 
the same time, I came to see the cantankerous side of his persona as being rooted in 
contrarianism, on beautiful display in his work on Hobbes, in which he gleefully argues against 
virtually everyone else that far from being an advocate of absolute power, Hobbes is really a 
critic of absolutism who is slyly demonstrating to us the impossibility of precisely what he 
appears to be championing: 
Hobbes was, as we might put it … a pretty smart fellow. If it is obvious to us...that the gimcrack 
contraption that he calls Leviathan could have little effective authority and even less power over 
its subjects, it might not be unreasonable to assume that he wanted it that way.1 
But that strong streak of individualism—by Flathman’s own description, nearly strong enough to 
make him an anarchist2—went hand-in-hand with an insistence that one’s identity is possible 
only in relation to the identities of others, and that the condition of possibility of individuality is 
participation in society. Indeed, we might read Flathman’s interpretation of Hobbes as being less 
about the exercise of sovereignty than about the possibility of radical individualism. The 
sovereign of the standard reading of Hobbes is in the best possible situation for an individual: he 
gets all of the benefits of social cooperation without having to accept any of the compromises. 
He alone is able to pursue his felicity utterly unhindered, indeed aided by his subjects. That is the 
best possible life for the side of Flathman that was a cranky individualist. But it’s all an illusion. 
The protean quality of language in particular makes absolute power impossible. The sovereign 
can only rule effectively by issuing laws whose language is sufficiently clear as to elicit the 
desired outcome. But language is too slippery, too multivalent, and ultimately too social a thing 
for one will to be able to command it in this way: “Words being necessary to the formulation and 
promulgation of laws, all words being subject to ambiguity and the multiplication of words 
therefore compounding the ambiguity, the legislator’s prospects of achieving perspicuity in laws 
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are less than bright.”3 Even the sovereign’s most Orwellian power, the right to determine the 
meanings of words, evaporates when we realize that meaning is determined socially, since 
meaning cannot merely be given but must also be accepted, and thus language is inevitably at 
least partially democratic. The sovereign must conceive and express himself in language that he 
has inherited and shares with others, and thus his apparently radical individuality is ultimately 
rooted in a profound sociality that can only partially be controlled or directed. 
It was characteristic of his thinking that where others saw a danger of power crushing 
individuality, Flathman saw openings and ambiguities—not exactly sites of resistance, but more 
like aporias that showed that the project of domination could not fully be put into practice. Some 
of that hopefulness came from the work of Wittgenstein, whose contextualist theory of language 
suggests that meaning emerges only socially (hence the impossibility of a private language), and 
that it is therefore always plural and mobile (hence the need for the metaphor of family 
resemblance to explain the difficulty of defining words precisely). In later work, Flathman drew 
on related ideas from Nietzsche and Foucault, and here, too, he continued to argue that where 
some saw a danger of domination, for example in Foucault’s description of subjectification, there 
were always interstices and flexibilities that left room for the possibility of individuality. Here is 
how Flathman summarizes this line of thinking in 2003’s Freedom and Its Conditions: 
It is the presence of attempts to constrain me—or the existence of forces constraining me—from 
doing that which I want to do, preventing me from accomplishing the purposes that I have set for 
myself, that, existentially and perhaps semantically, perhaps phenomenologically, perhaps 
ontologically, are necessary to the question of freedom arising and hence being answered 
negatively or positively. On this latter view, strongly suggested by Nietzsche and Foucault, and 
earlier by … Sextus Empiricus and especially Montaigne, discipline and freedom, so far from 
being antithetical, are not only imbricated but mutually dependent.4 
What gives Flathman’s contrarianism its dialectical quality is that he happily criticizes all of the 
available theoretical positions as being inadequate and internally contradictory, and, having left 
himself no position to take, sets up camp in the battlefield and takes upon himself the task of 
keeping the combatants fighting. Radical individualism is incoherent because it denies the ways 
in which identity is shaped by its participation in collectivity, but radical collectivism is 
incoherent both because it threatens to destroy the individuality that is the basis of real collective 
activity, and also because collectivity is always more plural and unruly than would-be 
authoritarians realize. The interesting work is not in defending individuality against collectivity, 
or collectivity against individuality, but in trying to show that the two can only exist in tension 
with each other, and in trying to clarify what a workable, more-or-less stable stalemate might 
look like. 
In trying to understand what form such as stalemate might take, Flathman drew on the work of 
Oakeshott and Arendt. I recall from a seminar discussion of Arendt’s conception of action that 
Flathman repeatedly drew our attention to the apparent paradox that one can only be a fully 
articulated individual by acting in the public eye, that one cannot even know oneself in isolation. 
Yet because the public eye is always potentially homogenizing, he favored Oakeshott’s societas 
model of social cooperation, while acknowledging that the participants will inevitably 
hypostatize collective goals: we aren’t just a society in which an individual may pursue his or her 
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own interests, but rather we are a society committed to enabling such things (and in so 
understanding ourselves, we undermine that very project). He was also much taken with 
Oakeshott’s idea of adverbial obligations, which are rules that we voluntarily impose upon 
ourselves to achieve a particular style of social cooperation. In Reflections of a Would-Be 
Anarchist Flathman advocates that we adopt adverbial virtús, ways of living that allow us to 
pursue our individuality in ways consistent with preserving social cooperation.5 He both praised 
and practiced Oakeshott’s ideal of liberal education as a training in a tradition of thought, not to 
seek for ready-made answers but to develop a vocabulary and set of concepts within which one 
might work and think. And it seems to me that Flathman was especially interested in Oakeshott’s 
distinction between a true individual—someone who lived in society, but on his or her own 
terms, in pursuit of his or her idiosyncratic goals— and an individual manqué—someone who, 
out of fear or lack of imagination, had become submerged in society and whose goals and 
aspirations have been provided pre-packaged. This highlights an important ethical dimension to 
Flathman’s thought: that although there was always the possibility of remaining an individual, 
one has to grasp that possibility and pursue it, or accept being swallowed. 
Ultimately, although Flathman’s contrarianism was of a piece with that ethical desire to seize the 
possibility of individuality by poking a stick in the eye of soi-disant authorities, it sprang from 
sources much deeper in his character than that. Thus we find him opening a 1970 essay on 
“Obligation, Ideals, and Ability” by writing: “It has been a favorite project of students of politics 
to take the life out of their subject matter.”6 And we find him paying his intellectual debts, in the 
Acknowledgements of Willful Liberalism, thus: “I have not been able to respond adequately to 
all of Sid Maskit’s objections to my appropriation of Hobbes, but I will get even with him for 
that.”7 Flathman took as much pleasure in poking his friends as he did his enemies. 
The old joke has it that a liberal is a man who won’t take his own side in an argument, and 
Richard Flathman was that kind of liberal: he defended individuality against social domination, 
social cooperation against individualist absurdity, and constant engagement against the desire to 
find some stable resolution at the cost of intellectual honesty, insisting rather that we remain 
“perpetually en voyage.”8 I shall miss him, and I can only hope that he will find some way to get 
back at me for saddling his memory with a label as pompous as “dialectical contrarianism.” 
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